LAWMALL
.COM

!! NEW !! - Anticipated Effect of Twin Towers / Pentagon Terrorism and War on Terrorism on Government Financing of Private Corporations

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Purpose of this Website: To Stop Job Theft and Globalization Activities by State and Local Economic Development Agencies

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About the Author of this Job-Theft and Anti-Globalization Website

1. Website on How to Prevent Wal-Mart and Other Superstores from Opening Up a Superstore in a Community; and How to Stop Globalization
2. Website on the Robinson-Patman Act Which Prohibits Price Discrimination and How to Recover Damages Caused by Unlawful Price Discrimination
3. New (2001) Website on How to Oppose Prosecutorial Misconduct and Abuse - Major Corporations and the Press Owned or Controlled by Them Are Often the Reason for Prosecutorial Misconduct and Abuse
4. An Earlier (1998) Website on Prosecutorial Misconduct and Abuse

For Carl Person's c.v. or resume, click on Carl Person C.V.

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!! NO FEE !! Speaking Engagements Wanted !! PLEASE LOOK AT SUGGESTED TOPICS !!

U.S. citizens must learn why they are working longer hours per day and week than the citizens of any other industrialized country, and why U.S. citizens are suffering from an ever-decreasing standard of living, while the rich are getting richer. There is an answer which the mainstream media and its owners and advertisers don't want you to learn, or use when making your political decisions.

What needs to be said cannot be said in a 10-second or 1-minute television story. It takes at least an hour to make some headway into the story to enable concerned citizens to understand what is happening to them.

My name is Carl Person. I am a civil rights and antitrust attorney and the author of this website; also, I am the plaintiff in the lawsuit discussed in this website to stop taxpayer financing of the NY Yankees, NY Mets and all other private corporations by governmental agencies. (A copy of the complaint can be seen at COPY OF COMPLAINT Filed 8/27/01 in the Job-Theft Lawsuit.)

I have been there and observed what is happening, and would like to tell the story to interested groups of persons, even persons or groups diametrically opposed to my concerns.

I ask for no stipend, honorarium or speaker's fee, only the roundtrip fare (economy, of course) and sometimes reimbursement for an inexpensive hotel room for the night (when my travel connections require an unwanted layover).

The types of groups which could be interested in having me speak include:

1. Political organizations;
2. Civic organizations;
3. Town or village meetings;
4. Colleges and universities;
5. Trade and professional associations;
6. Law schools, business schools, journalism schools, and schools to train people for government service (I'm not sure what to call them, but I mean schools such as the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government);
7. Business clubs (such as Kiwanis, Lions, BPOE, Shriners);
8. Corporate meetings (to point out how they can be better citizens, and what will happen to them as well, if present practices are not changed);
9. Groups wanting to stop superstore expansion into their community - See My Website on How to Stop Wal-Mart and Other Superstores from Coming into Your Community and Area;
10. Students interested in learning why the cost of a college education continues to climb while the prospects for paying off the student loans at the hourly rate now being offered to recent college grads is steadily declining;
11. What your community can do about the problem - a specific proposal I have for any community between 1,000 and 7,500 persons, approximately; see my specific proposal at Author's Specific Proposal for Small Towns and Communities;
12. Religious associations and organizations;
13. Any group interested in increasing opportunity and the standard of living for themselves, their children, their community and people generally.

The topics I would like to discuss include:

1. How Destructive Globalization Has Developed, and How It Can Be Stopped or Severely Curtailed;
2. Why a City, Town, Village or County Is Wasting Taxpayers' Money When Financing New Local Sites for Private Enterprise;
3. What a City, Town, Village or County Should Do When Thinking about Using Taxpayers' Money to Buy (i.e., Steal) Jobs for the Community;
4. How the Superstores Are Eliminating Business Competitors Throughout the United States and Beyond -- Based on Massive, Continuing Violations of Law -- with the Blessing and Support of the President (either party) and His/Her Corporate Backers
5. 33 Legal Reasons Why Taxpayer Financing of Private Corporations Is Illegal;
6. How to Stop a Superstore such as Wal-Mart or Home Depot from Coming into Your Community;
7. How Wal-Mart Destroys the Business, Property Values, Opportunity, Wage Levels, Tax Base, Local Budgets and Families When Coming into a Community - Just Because Local Residents Are Anxious to Save 20 Cents or So When Buying Toothpaste;
8. A Discussion of the Federal Statute (the Robinson-Patman Act) Which Prohibits Price Discrimination and the Treble-Damage Remedy against Competitors and Manufacturers Amounting to 9,000 Times One Day's Typical Loss of Gross Profits;
9. How Increased Concentration of the Economy (and Globalization) Has Increased the Amount of Prosecutorial Misconduct and Abuse by Federal and State Prosecutors, and What an Accused Person and His/Her Attorney Should Consider Doing to Offset Perceived Prosecutorial Abuse;

If you are interested in talking about the possibility of a speaking engagement, please call me at my office, 212-307-4444, or send a fax to me at 212-307-0247, or send me an email with your name, address, organization, email address and telephone and fax numbers, so I can respond. My email address is: carlpers@ix.netcom.com.

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How State and Local Economic Development Agencies Steal Jobs from Other States and Communities

"Stealing" may seem like a harsh word to use, but this is what the practice amounts to. Virtually every state, and many cities in the United States, have allocated money and personnel to the job of identifying major corporations willing to accept millions or hundreds of millions of dollars to keep their businesses (and jobs) where they are, or to move them into a city, when the city or state promises to pay them to do so.

So, what's wrong with that?

The answer is: A lot.

Let's start off by recognizing that the purpose is not to create jobs, but merely for politicians to be able to announce jobs. John Hood, president of the John Locke Foundation (a Raleigh NC think-tank advocating limited government and a free-market economy) states: "Creating jobs is not the goal of these [economic-incentive] programs. The goal of these programs is to create job announcements."

First of all, where does the money come from?

It comes from taxpayers, including the existing businesses in the city which would be injured by subsidies given to the favored corporation, and probably cause the injured businesses to lose business, fire many of its employees, pay lower taxes, have unused buildings in the area - things which hurt the city providing the subsidy.

Taxpayers are injured by having to pay more taxes to purchase jobs for a comparatively few persons, while causing perhaps an equal number of employed persons in the community to lose their jobs. The price paid per job in recent years has been as high as $170,000 (in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, which paid $253,000,000 in subsidies to Mercedes Benz to obtain 1,500 local jobs, at the rate of about $170,000 per job). Mercedes Benz and Tuscaloosa, Alabama didn't pick $253,000,000 out of the air; it resulted from a bidding process which Mercedes Benz had (or claims that it was having) with other cities in the United States (or elsewhere in the world) to see which city could offer Mercedes Benz the largest financial package to purchase the 1,500 jobs which were promised.

The city or town which would have obtained the plant (if job-theft activities had not occurred) was a major loser, having done everything to attract the new plant (including payment of the costs of good schools, good infrastructure, being in a good location, and other factors putting this town above all others in line for the plant -- except the inability or unwillingness to pay taxpayers' money for having the corporation do what it was going to do, regardless of any payment, which was to set up a plant in the United States, to enable it to be a manufacturer of cars in the largest market for car sales in the world.

The owners and employees of the existing businesses which now have competition imported into the city or town, and subsidized to the extent of as much as $1,000,000 per job (in the most extreme case), also wind up as losers, losing their businesses and/or their jobs. Many of them wind up on welfare, paid for as an additional expense by the city, not the favored corporation.

Existing employers who chose the town or city because of favorable labor conditions now find that they have a major corporation bidding for the available local labor (assuming that in some cases they are offering jobs higher than the minimum wage, such as to steal employees from their existing competitors), which could increase the costs of labor to these competitors and/or some other existing businesses in the area, without any subsidy from the local government to pay for such increased labor costs; but any such increase in labor costs would be of a very short duration, because the new superstore would cause an immediate loss of sales and income for many of the existing stores in the area, a cessation of hiring new employees and the termination of employees by the existing stores, followed by many of the existing stores going out of business and having no employees at all; and the stolen employees are either terminated or cut back to lower wage levels; thus, any immediate increase in the labor rate would be offset and more by the disastrous effect which the new superstore will have on existing competition and the persons employed by the existing competition; the effect after everything settles down within a few months or so would be a decline in the average wage for employees in the area, with 40% of the Wal-Mart employees being on welfare see discussion at Website on Wal-Mart - Choose menu option entitled &qupt;The Arguments Against Wal-Mart and Any Further Wal-Mart Expansion".

It is estimated by Bill Quinn, author of How Wal-Mart Is Destroying America (at p. 40) that 80% of Wal-Mart's workforce is earning the minimum wage; Wal-Mart's employees work about 28 hours per week (designed by Wal-Mart to avoid paying benefits), and at $5.15 per hour (the present federal minimum hourly wage)to $6.50 per hour they earn about $144.20 to $182 per week before deductions for social security, disability insurance, federal, state and city income taxes, leaving an amount insufficient to support anyone or any family, and necessitating that the Wal-Mart employee obtain a 2nd or 3rd job and/or go on welfare to be able to pay the rent, pay for medical expenses and buy food, clothing and other necessaries of life.

Also, it should be noted that for every employeed by Wal-Mart the local-area businesses lose 1.5 higher-paid employees; the reason for this is that Wal-Mart sells a higher amount of goods in dollar amount per employee than its competitors, and pays its employees substantially less per hour.

Then, too frequently, the favored corporation (after receiving its promised benefits up front) fails to stay in the city, and moves all or a major part of its business activities and jobs to some other city (probably for another economic inducement), with the taxpayers, former competitors, the former employees of the former competitors, and the newly-fired employees and others holding the bag.

The favored corporation laughs each time it goes to the bank with its ill-gotten gains, the only sure and often repeated winner in the job-theft process.

As Ralph Nader stated in his 2000 Campaign, Welfare and Labor Website Ralph Nader 2000 Campaign Website: Welfare and Labor about New Haven CT's proposed $500 million Long Wharf mall:

Retail malls siphon off business from central cities

This is welfare for the rich on the backs of the poor and middle class. The attention of the mayor should be how to create a more cohesive, self-sustaining, prosperous central city. You don’t do that by siphoning off retail dollars to a nearby massive mall. Big businesses are on a collision course with American democracy, and the American democracy is losing.

Source: New Haven Register, page a3, a6 May 18, 2000

In a 11/6/99 Los Angeles Times article "Living Wage Group [Advocates] Businesses Contracting with County ... Would Be Required to Riase Minimum Salaries to Keep Workers Off Welfare", stating in part:

Members of the coalition, including union leaders, community activists and clergy, say businesses that enjoy government contracts or subsidies are shirking their responsibility to taxpayers by paying such low wages that employees then turn to welfare, food banks and Medicaid to get by.

"Taxpayers are having to pay the social costs of poverty: from public assistance to Medicaid to a higher crime rate," said coalition chairman Marcos Vargas. * * *

As part of its campaign, coalition members are singling out companies that receive taxpayer money but do not pay what they call a living wage, including Wal-Mart, which received development subsidies to open its store in Oxnard.

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What a Special Report and Investigation by TIME Magazine Says about This Job-Theft Practice

In Time magazine, edition of November 9, 1998, in its 7,500 word "Special Report / Corporate Welfare - States at War", starting at page 40, Time stated in summary: "Shrewd companies are increasingly pitting politicians against one another in a quest for bigger and better tax breaks. Yet rarely do these subsidies create jobs, and the incentives sometimes rob government coffers of funds that could be used to improve services for you and your neighbors."

The Time article went on to say about the statements by politicians that they created jobs for the community through their job-theft activities:

Don't believe it.

Jobs are created, of course, by the American economy-not by this process.

TIME's investigation has established that almost without exception, local and state politicians have doled out tens of billions of dollars to businesses that are in fact eliminating rather than creating jobs., Some of the money has gone to prop up individual companies and avoid the consolidation within industries that an unfettered market would bring about. Some has been pumped into profitable companies, making them more profitable Some has been awarded to companies that have threatened to move if they don't get it. Some has been diverted to businesses that local politicians have divined will be more successful than their competitors. And last, some has gone to entire industries that are shrinking.

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Continual Effort by New York City to Finance and Refinance Baseball Stadiums for the New York Yankees and the New York Met - Apparently Abandoned as a Consequence of the 9/11/01 Terrorist Attacks

For years the politicians in New York City and New York State have been advocating and pushing for subsidies amounting to potentially hundreds of millions of dollars to build a new baseball stadium for the New York Yankees (in the Bronx) and for the New York Mets (in Queens).

10/9/01 Note: This long-run intention by government officials came to an abrupt end on 9/11/01 as a result of the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers and devastation of 16 acres of downtown Manhattan and hundreds or businesses and hundreds of thousands of jobs. New York State has stated to Judge Pauley in the job-theft lawsuit that the proposal for government financing of the Yankee and Mets ballparks has now been placed on the "back burner". On the other hand, there is no stated intention of abandoning all such financing. New York City still has plans to provide financing for a new trading floor for the New York Stock Exchange, a privately-owned corporation whose members earned $20 billion in profits last year.

A New York Daily News page-5 article (referred to on the front page) entitled "Rudy pitch: Don't drop ball on stadiums" makes the customary pitch, stating:

Mayor Giuliani issued a warning yesterday to people who oppose new stadiums for the Yanks and Mets: Build them -- and pay for them -- or the teams may leave.

"You can spin this, [but] the reality is if you want a new ballpark, the city is going to have to put money in," Giuliani said on his weekly ABC radio show.

The mayor said he couldn't expect the Yanks or Mets to foot the whole bill for new stadiums "because other teams haven't had to do that, and the offers [to relocate] are too good elsewhere" [referring to the Yankees' threatened move to New Jersey].

"The Yankees and the Mets will make substantial contributions to the building of [these] ballparks, which they did not make in the past," Giuliana said.

"The city and the state are also going to have to put something in. That's the way it is, or otherwise we will be talking about these new ballparts for the next 10 or 15 years," he added.

The city has been looking at a host of options for funding the stadiums, including cash and bonds. Democratic mayoral candidates have been sharply critical of the mayor for his willingness to spend on stadiums.

A Daily News 7/6/01 article stated that the Mets stadium would cost approximately $500,000,000; and that New York's Governor Pataki stated New York State would provide infrastructure and transportation costs. A 7/4/01 Daily News article indicated the proposed Yankee Stadium would cost $800,000,000 plus overruns. Thus, NYC is facing a $1.3 billion expense (plus overruns) in the near future, of which the 7/6/01 article stated the Yankees and Mets are to provide about 1/3rd of the costs. [An 8/25/00 New York Times article states the total cost for the two stadiums is estimated at $1.5 billion.] This leaves an estimated $1,000,000,000 shortfall, as an additional expense for NYC taxpayers, unless the practice is stopped. I can think of millions of NYC taxpayers who would prefer to have faster bus and subway service, or better schools, instead.

The obvious thing is that there are only so many teams in either baseball major league, and that each team needs one baseball stadium, and that if a new stadium is really needed, when looking at the location of the present stadium, the baseball team will build, rent, move or do what it needs to do from a business standpoint with or without payment by New York State and New York City, or a competing city and state.

If there is a sufficient demand in New York City for live attendance at major-league baseball games, the baseball leagues and their member teams know what to do. Perhaps it would take a reduction of salaries paid to excessively-compensated stars. The persons who attend live games and the TV and radio rights should pay for any new stadiums. The persons who don't attend the live games shouldn't be paying for the stadiums with their tax dollars.

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10/26/01 Public Hearing by NYC Economic Development Corporation on Proposed NY Stock Exchange $1.2 Billion Financing Deal

As a result of the filing of the lawsuit, and related publicity, I was informed by Ms. Bettina Damiani, email address: gjny@ctj.org, of Good Jobs New York, a group watching NYC's activities in financing private corporations, that a secret (i.e., non-publicized) "public" hearing was scheduled to be held on September 11, 2001 (later rescheduled for 10/26/01), relating to the taxpayer financing of the privately-owned New York Stock Exchange, in the apparent amount of $1.2 billion. Ms. Damiani urged me to sign up as a witness, which I did. Apparently, I am one of a limited number of witnesses who have indicated an intention to testify.

There seems to be no valid reason for taxpayers to give any amount of money, especially $1.2 billion to a private corporation whose members earned $20 billion during the preceding year.

On August 29, 2001, I received notice by email from the NYC Economic Development Corporation that the scheduled "public" hearing was adjourned to October 9, 2001, and have subsequently learned from Ms. Damiani that the hearing has been adjourned again, to October 26, 2001 - at 10:00 a.m.

I urge that anyone wanting to testify for or against the project sign up as a witness for this 10/26/01 hearing (which you must remember might be adjourned again or indefinitely).

You can do this by mailing, calling, faxing or emailing David Shelley, Paralegal/Records Access Officer, NYC Economic Development Corporation, Industrial Development Agency, 110 William Street, New York, New York, 10038, Phone: 212-312-3543; Fax: 212-312-3912; Email: dshelley@nycedc.com.

Please send a copy to me for my information; also, I would be pleased to talk with you, whichever side of the issue you may be on.

Why do NYS and NYC want to finance expansion of the stock exchange at this particular time? The public isn't stupid. It knows there is no need for any expansion (before or after 9/11/01). Here's what the press is saying about the securities business and NYC during 2001:

"Schwab's work force will be down 25% from the beginning of 2001" (source: p. 1 of 9/3/01 Pensions and Investments, published by Crain Communications, Inc.); Schwab's trading volume is down 50% from 1999, according to The Nightly Business Report, 8/30/01, Community Television Foundation of South Florida, Inc., which stated: "Investors also took note of new layoffs at Charles Schwab (SCH) brokerage, bringing its workforce back to 1999 levels. Schwab says trading volume is down 50 percent."

Newsday, New York, NY 8/15/01 stated that Wall Street layoffs are threatening the Long Island and New York City economies, reporting at P. A51 that:

In what is becoming a familiar trend on Wall Street, Citigroup, the country's largest financial services company, said it plans to dismiss 3,500 employees as analysts say it grapples with declines in the stock market. * * *

The latest round of cuts follows an announcement earlier this year by Citigroup that it would slash 1,200 positions.... Citigroup's move comes on the heels of job cuts by several other leading financial services firms.

"Wall Street is in trouble," said veteran analyst Richard Bove, from Raymond James & Associates in St. Petersburg, Fla. "Because liquidity is drying up in the marketplace, stock prices and the flow of funds are going down, there will be continuous cutbacks. Citi is doing what everybody else is doing. This is not the last of the layoffs." * * *

... experts say they are most likely to come out of Citigroup's Corporate and Investment Bank division, which is comprised of brokerages Salomon Smith Barney and Citibank's corporate bank. * * *

The layoffs threaten the economies of New York City and Long Island, said Pearl Kamer, chief economist at the Long Island Association.

"Many Wall Street bonuses have fueled the buying of mansions and the furs out here," Kamer said. "In New York City, the impact would be much worse, because Wall Street is more interconnected to the City's economy."

Sohn and Kamer believe more layoffs are in the offing, as the economic slowdown and market slump impact company revenues.

"This shake-up is long overdue," Sohn said. "The party went on for too long and the punch bowl was filled too many times. Now the party is over and we have to sober up."

In the last few months, Wall Street has been awash in layoffs.

Merrill Lynch & Co., American Express Co., Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., Charles Schwab Corp., Goldman Sachs Group, Bear Stearns & Co. and Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. have all said they are laying off thousands of people because of slumping revenues.

Why didn't anyone tell New York City Hall about these layoffs? Instead of expanding the trading floor of the New York Stock Exchange they should be ripping out some of the unneeded computers and other equipment and donating the equipment to New York City's public schools (for a tax deduction), except that many of the needed NYC public schools don't exist because of the lack of taxpayer funds.

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Examples of Economic/Industrial Development Job-Theft Deals

There are various types of deals, from financing a stadium for the for-profit owners of a baseball or football team; licensing and partial financing of a new Wal-Mart or other superstore; and the acquisition of land (through condemnation) and financing of a factory for assembling automobiles or other products.

The elements of a deal by a city to keep a large corporation in the city, or to lure a corporation into the city, have become somewhat standardized and predictable, containing a package of economic benefits from the following menu of possible benefits:

1. The precise plot of land which the corporation believes would best suit its purpose, with the city and state evicting the present owners and users of such land through condemnation (for the city or its development agency to acquire title to the land, and to assemble the different components from various owners), followed by the titling of the land, or grant of a long-term lease, to the corporation for its private corporate purposes;
2. Payment to the former owners of the land through tax-free industrial revenue bonds issued by the city and recognized by the investment community as an obligation of the city to pay; the bonds are issued at lower than market interest rates because of their tax-free status;
3. Retention of all sales tax proceeds by the favored corporation for a lengthy period of time, such as 10 years, so that the sales taxes collected by the corporation as sales taxes (at least from their customers' standpoint) are not treated as sales tax proceeds and are kept by the corporation instead, as part of the overall financial package to induce them to stay in, or move into, the city; the city loses such revenues for such period of time, and the competitors going out of business create a permanent loss of sales tax revenues they were previously generating;
4. Structual improvements, such as putting in sewers, paved roadways, traffic lights, street lights to the favored corporation's new facilities in the city;
5. A higher cost of policing the area around new superstores such as Wal-Mart, which adds to the unexpected costs of the city when competing for and then winning the opportunity to have a superstore come into the city or town and injure many of the town's existing businesses, while providing $6.50 per hour parttime jobs where 40% of the Wal-Mart employees require welfare to survive.
6. Cash payments to the favored corporation;
7. Assumption of all or partial construction costs;
8. Payment of costs of training new employees for the corporation;
9. Abatement of (i.e., not collecting) real estate taxes from the favored corporation for an extended period of time, such as 10-years;
10. Helping the favored corporation obtain the required licenses and other approvals which even existing local businesses could not have obtained, and doing so at the time and expense of the city or town;
11. Construction of a railroad spur;
12. Tax credits for new employees;
13. Discount on sewer bills for the next 15-20 years;
14. Construction of sewage-treatment plant;
15. Construction of sewers;
16. The future costs of contamination of the local water supply by the favored corporation;
17. Other payments and benefits referred to elsewhere in this and the related websites.

Examples of Public Subsidies to Major Corporations

1. Mercedes Benz obtained a $253,000,000 package from Tuscaloosa, Alabama, with a promise of 1,500 car-manufacturing jobs;
2. NYC awarded $31 million in incentives to Kidder, Peabody Group, Inc. in 10/93 for alleged job retention;
3. Memphis/Shelby County TN awarded $20 million in incentives to Birmingham Steel Corp. in 7/95;
4. Philadelphia and Pennsylvania awarded $307 million (plus $119 million in federal aid) to Kvaerner ASA, Europe's largest shipbuilder;
5. Nebraska awarded $7.5 million in tax credits to Nebraska Beef plus a laundry list of other benefits, making the total about $24 to $31 million; Nebraska Beef pays about $8.00 per hour to its employees, with a quick turnover;
6. During 1991, Monroe County, New York gave Swedish conglomerate subsidiary ABB Instrumentation, Inc. $26 million in tax breaks, resulting in the elimination of 426 jobs in Monroe County;
7. A similar result occurred when Kentucky granted G.E. Corp. $19 million in tax breaks, with an additional $1 million paid by Louisville and Jefferson County; G.E. announced later than it was moving 1,500 jobs to Georgia and Mexico, where wages are lower;
8. There are thousands of additional transactions by one or more of the 1,000 EDA's in the United States, amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars of taxpayers' money handed over to the richest corporations in the world, often with additional losses to be borne by the taxpayers, including loss of competing businesses, loss of employment in completing businesses, decline in property values, hiring of employees by the favored superstore corporation at minimum wage (with 40% of the workers going on public assistance while they are employed); and excessive burdens on local school systems.

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   Government Financing of Superstore Expansion and Competition with Existing Small Business in the Area

   In several related websites, I explain how manufacturers throughout the United States are selling their goods to major superstore chains [in violation of the federal Robinson-Patman Act] at prices per unit which are either (i) at or below the manufacturers' variable (per unit) cost and/or (ii) about 25% to 80% less than the price paid per unit, to the same manufacturers, by independent, small-business competitors of the major superstore chains -- with the result that the independent, small-business competitors [and future competitors] are being driven out of business throughout the United States, and the nation's manufacturers of goods are selling an increasingly higher percentage of their goods at or below the manufacturers' variable cost, putting increasing and extreme financial pressure on many of the manufacturers.

   The website, called RPAMall(tm), discusses many aspects to the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA), and how major superstore chains unlawfully induce the manufacturers to violate the RPA. RPAMall is located at http://www.lawmall.com/rpa .

   A copy of the initial complaint filed in federal court by 200 auto-parts wholesalers and jobbers against the nation's 8-9 largest superstore chains which retail auto parts (AutoZone, Advance Auto, CSK Auto, Wal-Mart and its Sams Club division, Keystone Automotive, O'Reilly Automotive, Pep Boys, and Discount Auto Parts) is available through one of the menu options at http://www.lawmall.com/autopart.

   Also, please look at my website on how to stop a superstore from coming into an area, together with information on how to stop destructive globalization, the address of which website is: http://www.lawmall.com/wal-mart .

   Not only are major superstore chains obtaining discriminatory pricing from private corporations (the nation's manufacturers of goods bought by the superstore chains), but we see that the same major superstore chains are obtaining governmental financing for the expansion of the businesses, which enables them to increase their market share, at the expense of the independent, small-business competitors who receive no such governmental financing.

   Communities complain that they are losing their tax base (probably not realizing why) and feel constrained to pay taxpayer money to major superstore chains to come into the area and cause further destruction to small business, at governmental expense and participation.

   Here are some recent economic development deals in which state, county, city or other local governments (and sometimes the U.S. government) are financing superstore expansion:

   1. Wal-Mart, 203,000 sq. ft. supercenter in St. Thomas, Louisiana, $15,000,000 store with 900 parking places, announced 7/21/01 in The Times-Picayune (New Orleans), partly financed the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, and by the local government involving a "TIF" deal, expressed as follows:

      The company [Wal-Mart] has spent nearly $115 million building new distribution centers in Robert and Opelousas. The state of Louisiana provided nearly $8 million in infrastructure improvements to both. * * *

      Another major hurdle will be the city administration and ultimately the City Council, which must sign off on a tax incremental financing deal. Known as TIFs, under the deal a developer or retailer is allowed to take in property and even sales taxes to use to defray the cost of a project. The theory is that governments wouldn't capture the taxes if the development wasn't built in the first place, but the community can still benefit from the economic spin-off.

   2. Wal-Mart, $13,000,000, 403,000 sq. foot tire distribution center in Hayworth, Illinois (a village in Central Illinois), announced 7/10/01 in Associated Press wire story; to employ 125 people; with the following interesting facts:

      The deal calls for a $2 million incentive package from the village and about $1 million from the state. * * * [EDA Chairperson Dobski said:] "Over the last one and a half years, Heyworth has experienced several business closings, and tax dollars for small communities are becoming rare. This is a great opportunity that doesn't come by too often." * * *

      Trustees rejected the project a week earlier, saying they needed more information about its financing. [Later, another official said:] "This is a great project for a small town. Last week, we did not have all the facts. I'm hoping all the finances go through. I think we can work through them."

   3. Discount Auto Parts, Inc. (Lakeland FL), to break ground on $25 million, 400,000 sq. foot auto-parts distribution center in Gallman, Miss., servicing its stores in MI, LA, TX, AR and GA, to employ 250 to 300 people and be operational by January 2001, 4/13/00 Associated Press wire story, which reported:

      [A county official stated:] "It is very needed in our county. We have a lot of people that could use a job and when you get something like this it may make other employers pay more to their workers. It would be one of our biggest employers." * * * C. Michael Moore, chief financial officer for Discount Auto Parts, confirmed that the location works well for his company, which hopes to expand its markets across the Southeast.

      "The 77-acre site we selected in Copiah County is well-located to provide us with the geographic accessibility we sought to service our current and expanding markets in the Southeast," Moore said. "The site also was advantageous for the company because of the excellent package of economic incentives offered by Copiah County."

      Discount Auto Parts is one of the Southeast's leading specialty retailers and suppliers of automotive replacement parts. The company currently operates over 600 stores located throughout Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana and South Carolina.

   4. Discount Auto Parts, Inc. (Lakeland FL), CEO and president suddenly resign, Discount Auto Parts' profits are half as much even though sales have doubled, Discount Auto will probably be acquired and change its headquarters, as a loss to the Lakeland community; the 1/19/01 Lakeland FL Ledger article also reported (interestingly):

      In the four years since Perkins took over, Discount Auto has gone from about 360 stores to the current 665. Its stores are now in Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and South Carolina. Meanwhile, its sales rose from $ 307 million to about $ 600 million at the end of 2000.

      While sales have risen, profits have dropped. In its most recent quarter, Discount Auto had after-tax profits of $ 2.3 million. During the same quarter four years ago, the company had just over half as many stores, but more than double the profit -- $ 6.9 million.

      Discount Auto's board of directors comprises Fontaine, Perkins, Charles Webster Jr., David Walling and E.E. Wardlow. According to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission documents, Webster runs two business consulting firms. Walling and Wardlow are both former Kmart Corp. executives. * * *

      Any time the county loses a company headquarters, "that's a loss," local ECD chairman McDermott said. "The future of the company is no longer being directed locally, and that is something that is less desirable from our standpoint." * * *

      Discount Auto Parts has a Polk workforce of 1,200 and is the county's 10th largest private employer. It has 19 local stores.

   5. AutoZone and Memphis TN co-finance AutoZone Park, an $80,000,000 Triple-A Pacific Coast League ballpark, reports the 2/18/01 The Fresno Bee, which also stated:

      Memphis was able to hold its public contribution to $8.5 million -- $4.25 million each from the city and Shelby County -- plus redevelopment costs because of the civic zeal of Dean Jernigan, founder and chairman of Storage USA Inc., and his wife, Kristi. * * *

      Economists and urban planners say stadiums and arenas don't justify huge public expenditures.

      Among the arguments against public financing of stadiums is that sports franchises divert money from existing entertainment and provide a poor return on investment. Planners say cities would be smarter to fix up housing in downtown neighborhoods.

      "Increased productivity can arise in two ways: from economically beneficial specialization by the community for the purpose of trading with other regions or from local value-added that is higher than other uses of local workers, land and investments," wrote Roger G. Noll, professor of economics at Stanford University, and Andrew Zimbalist, professor of economics at Smith College, in a book criticizing public subsidies for professional sports franchises.

      "Building a stadium is good for the local economy only if a stadium is the most productive way to make capital investments and use its workers."

   6. AutoZone seeks to expand (by doubling) its LaFayette LA distribution warehouse with government financing, and hire an additional 60 employees, reports 6/29/94 The Advocate (Baton Rouge, LA), which also stated:

      AutoZone plans to seek tax breaks for the expansion. The facility is located at North Park Industrial Park, Poole said, which is in an enterprise zone.

      Under a program administered by the state Department of Economic Development, AutoZone qualifies for refunds on sales taxes for hiring new employees from low-income families.

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   The Losers and Winners in State/Local Job Thefts

   The winners in the job-theft deals are always the corporations, which obtain funds they didn't have and don't deserve, in exchange for setting up a plant which had to go somewhere.

   When was the last time any city or state ever paid you to set up a business for yourself? Why should the state or city be paying to finance your competition? Clearly, they should not be doing this. It only creates a non-level and unfair playing field which makes it difficult for the persons already living and working in the town or city, and paying taxes to the town or city, to survive, while favoring a newcomer.

   The taxpayers are the obvious losers. It always works that way.

   The existing businesses obtain new competitors financed with taxes paid by the existing businesses and their employees, which is totally unfair.

   The politicians responsible for this situation are lauded as successful politicians by the newspapers, television news stories and radio stations which carry the advertising and desired editorial content of the major corporations which are benefitting from these deals throughout the United States. The public doesn't get the truth and suspects something is wrong, but usually can't put it all together in time to stop the theft.

   The employees who are to lose their jobs as a result of the new competitor financed by their own city are also obvious losers.

   When the favored corporation leaves the city after receiving its benefits package, it generally takes away the jobs and leaves its new employees holding the bag after a relatively short period of employment.

   The favored corporation may also leave behind an empty concrete building surrounded by acres of black asphalt, which will go unused for years, and be an eyesore and economic blight for the community for years to come.

   There is no justification for using state and city money to finance large businesses. They have enough money of their own. If anyone needs to be financed, it's the small businesses consisting of each citizen of the town who is in, or would like to go into, business at the city's expense.

   The practice of job theft by the above procedure appears to be illegal and should be stopped.

   This website lays out a game plan for ending the practice in the United States.

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   How Job Stealing Relates to Globalization

   Globalization is destroying the middle class in the United States. Globalization is making the rich richer, and the middle class poorer. It also is taking away the safety net from the poor and making them poorer.

   Unwittingly, the citizens of the United States have permitted this to take place, by permitting the superstores to wipe out competing independent businesses (such as drug stores, hardware stores, newspaper stands, auto parts, book stores, toy and game stores, grocery stores, beverage stores, small restaurants, variety stores, office supplies, appliances, records, videos, independent movie houses, most stores on the main streets of small towns in the United States. To create a list of the types of stores which have gone out of business, all you need to do is create a list of superstores and what they sell, then try to recall what types of businesses used to sell those goods before the superstores came into being.

   The reason that the superstores put the small competitors out of business is simple, but little known. Each of the superstores is buying their goods at illegally low prices from manufacturers, who sell the same goods to small stores at prices about 50% to 100% higher. Thus, if an independent auto-parts retailer pay $20 for a part, his superstore competitor was able to buy the same part for about $10 to $12, and offers it for, say, $17. The independent retailer, to make a profit, has to offer the same part to the public for about $28, but can't, because the public buys their auto parts from the superstores, which sell them less expensively. For a further discussion of price discrimination, see my Robinson-Patman Act website, at Robinson-Patman Act Website Explaining Price Discrimination and Its Disastrous Consequences for Independent Competitors

   Why, we should ask, should states and cities be subsidizing superstores, which already are putting independent small businesses out of business because of their illegal purchasing arrangements.

   Superstores have taken over retailing in the United States. See my website on stopping Wal-Mart and other superstores from coming into a town at Stopping Wal-Mart and Other Superstores - and Stopping Globalization.

   Now that superstores have taken over retailing in the largest market in the world, they have gained sufficient size and momentum to spread their illegal practice to other areas of the world, through globalization, to wipe out independent businesses in countries outside of the United States, as well.

   If businesses, legislators and economists in the United States had seen what was happening and cried out for help in stopping superstore expansion (and some tried), and if the press (owned by the superstore interests and their allies) had told the public about what was happening, the superstores could have been stopped. But, politicians were bought off to permit those already owning newspapers, television stations and radio stations to acquire more of them to solidify their monopoly on the news, and the result is that there were no mass media left to below the whistle, and the superstores romped through the U.S. destroying small and independent businesses, while acquiring market share in the world's largest market sufficient for them to expand into other countries and wipe out their small and independent businesses as well.

   Without having this market share in the United States, the push for globalization would probably not have been made, or would not have succeeded to the extent it has.

   What we do not need is our cities, towns and states proving any support for globalization, and yet they do, by financing superstores through deals which give superstores packages of benefits for coming into town A, instead of town B 5 miles away. Both towns suffer; the towns don't get what they thought they were getting; the superstores wipe out local businesses, and gain additional market share in the United States with which to make their globalization efforts in other countries more successful.

   Towns, cities and states should not be allowed to contribute tax dollars to support superstores and globalization. This website lays out a game plan to stop the practice throughout the United States, through litigation, a more direct route than through publicity and legislation (which you may have gathered by now would probably not succeed).

   RETURN TO: Index and Quick Links to Website Material

   Current Lawsuit to Stop State/Local Job Thefts

   It seems that every one of the 50 states in the United States has one or more economic development agencies to try to attract business to the state, or a specific city in the state, and to keep businesses from leaving the state or city.

   New York State has approximately 90 economic development agencies. See List of State and Local Economic Development Agencies Which Are Named as Members of the Class of Defendants in the Job-Theft Lawsuit

   To try to undo this thicket of statutes, rules, regulations, agencies, vested interests, special deals, gravy trains for their leaders, and others, it would be impossible through state by state, city by city legislation. Also, it would probably be impossible to mount a successful campaign to have the job-theft practices outlawed by federal statute, because of the value of stealing jobs from other states and communities by politicians who aren't able (or choose not) to generate new jobs by legitimate means.

   A federal lawsuit has the advantage of being able to present the issues to one person, the single judge assigned to the case, and to have a ruling from him/her which is binding on all states, towns, cities, and economic development agencies in the United States, to bring the practice to and end simultaneously, perhaps even voluntarily if the parties agree to ending the practice through binding court settlement.

   It should be noted that litigation is the place where oppression is fought - the oppression of the majority on the minority. The majority (legislators elected with money received from the multi-national corporations, superstores and other rich persons) have passed the laws which enable the legislators and state and local agencies hand out money to the multi-national corporations (such as Mercedes Benz) and superstores/multi-national corporations (such as Wal-Mart), and in doing so are oppressive of the interests of taxpayers and competitors, who are injured by this giveaway program.

   The courts were intended by the architects of our system to be able to provide relief to the oppressed when the activities of the majority exceed the boundaries set forth in the U.S. Constitution and the various State Constitutions.

   This lawsuit will be based upon the illegality of the practices of stealing jobs through paying public funds to private corporations. The legal bases for such action appear to be quite strong. This, of course, is for the courts to decide.

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   Job-Theft Lawsuit Names All 1,000 Governmental Development Agencies in the US as Members of a Class of Defendants - to Stop Job Thefts Nationally by a Single Court Decision

   This action has been brought as a class action, not a class of plaintiffs (which is the typical class action), but alleging a class of defendants, consisting of all 1,000 governmental economic development agencies (EDA's) in the United States and its territories. The idea for the class action aspect of the lawsuit is to be able to bind all EDA's in the US at the same time to a policy of not paying for jobs, so that when one city stops, it won't be at a comparative disadvantage caused by other cities still paying for jobs. Also, a class action would facilitate settlement by the defendants, who ought to agree through this lawsuit not to participate in the present extortionate system of forcing communities to pay taxpayer moneys for jobs which are going to go somewhere. The jobs ought to go to the communities which on their own merits would obtain such new jobs, without the intervention of bribes paid by cities to induce the large corporations to go where they really don't want to go, as a first choice, and to stop the first-choice cities from having to pay for the jobs they should be getting by reason of how good the town is for all businesses operating in the town.

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   Legal Theories Underlying the Job-Theft Lawsuit, Including Additions and Revisions for Amended Complaint to be Filed

   Note: The legal theories listed in subparagraphs a through p below are already included in the complaint as filed, and the legal theories listed in subparagraphs q through gg below are going to be added in the first amendment to the complaint.

   Complaint paragraph 51 below, including its subparagraphs a through gg, is a continuing revision and refinement of the legal theories underlying the complaint. The order of the legal theories is not intended to be suggestive of the importance or strength of any specific legal theory.

   51. The activities of each of the defendants and members of the class of defendants are unlawful and in violation of, or infringe the rights of the plaintiff, under the following constitutional provisions, statutes, or other rules of law:

   a. 28 U.S.C. Sections 2201 and 2202, action for declaratory judgment;

   b. 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, which requires equal rights under the law for all persons in the United States, as follows: "(a) Statement of equal rights. All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other."

   c. 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, as state action depriving plaintiff of rights secured under the United States and State Constitutions, and federal and state statutes, and other rules and doctrines of law;

   d. Impermissible burden on interstate commerce, prohibited by U.S. Constitution, Sec. 8, Cl 3, "Power of Congress to regulate commerce.", which states: "To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.";

   e. Denial of Due Process, prohibited by the 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution; and equivalent provisions in various State Constitutions;

   f. Denial of Equal Protection, prohibited by the 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution; and equivalent provisions in various State Constitutions; for example: NY CLS Const Art I, Section 11 (2001) ("No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof.")

   g. Special legislation prohibited by the Constitutions of various states, including New York, as follows: NY CLS Const Art III, Section 17 (2001): "The legislature shall not pass a private or local bill in any of the following cases: * * * Granting to any private corporation, association or individual any exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever. [or] Granting to any person, association, firm or corporation, an exemption from taxation on real or personal property.";

   h. Lending to Private corporation prohibited by the Constitutions of various states, including New York, as follows: NY CLS Const Art VIII, Section 1 (2001) ("No county, city, town, village or school district shall give or loan any money or property to or in aid of any individual, or private corporation or association, or private undertaking, or become directly or indirectly the owner of stock in, or bonds of, any private corporation or association; nor shall any county, city, town, village or school district give or loan its credit to or in aid of any individual, or public or private corporation or association, or private undertaking, except .... [omitted]");

   i. Commercial bribery, prohibited under federal and state Constitutions, statutes and other law; [if state universities and their coaches can be accused of conspiracy, bribery and extortion for their payments to recruit football players, how does this differ from the state or government paying corporations to recruit jobs? suggested by 8/30/01 New York Daily News story at p. 107 entitled "H.S. coaches indicted in scandal"

   j. Unlawful economic coercion and extortion prohibited under federal and state Constitutions, statutes and other law, including 18 U.S.C. Section 1951 (defining "extortion" as "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right."; and under New York law, New York Penal Law Section 155.40 (obtained by extortion: "or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely");

   k. Unlawful misappropriation use and theft of tax revenues and public funds for private corporate use;

   l. Violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. Sections 1961, et seq. and comparable "little RICO statutes" in more than half of the states, including New York: New York Penal Law Section 460.20 (enterprise corruption);

   m. Violation of federal mail fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. Sections 1341 (mail fraud) and 1343 (fraud by wire, radio or television), and various statutes in all states prohibiting fraud and schemes to defraud, including New York: New York Penal Law Section 190.65 (prohibiting schemes to defraud); one instance of the alleged fraud is the failure of the favored corporations to advise the ECD's that the corporation is buying virtually all of its goods in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act (paying perhaps half as much per unit) and that the existing businesses in the ECD's area will be unable to remain in business as a result (and that the existing employees of such businesses will lose their jobs);

   n. Violation of various statutes in all states prohibiting grand larceny (by false promise), including New York: New York Penal Law Section 155.35;

   o. Violation of federal and state securities laws and rules, including the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. Section 12(2) (to the extent that publicity efforts to obtain taxpayer and government approval may be deemed a prospectus); Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5; Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Section 78j(b); and the New York Martin Act, New York General Business Law Section 352-c prohibiting fraud, deception, unrealistic promises with respect to the sale of securities;

   p. Unlawful looting of the public treasury through corrupt dealings between state officials and private corporations, with resulting failure of the states, cities and towns to obtain or enforce the benefit of their bargain and failure to obtain recovery of the moneys and other benefits transferred to the favored corporations;

   q. violation of Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, as conspiracies in unreasonable restraint in trade, and to monopolize, and to attempt to monopolize; and as per se restraints of trade; and in violation of Section 2 as unlawful monopolization and attempts and conspiracy to monopolize;

   r. unconstitutional delegation of state legislative power (if there is such a legislative power) to ECD's because of lack of standards, or justiciable standards, for the giveaway of taxpayers' money to private corporations;

   s. arbitrary, selective, discriminatory payment of taxpayer moneys to private companies;

   t. against public policy, to pay taxpayers' money to private corporations for many reasons set forth in the complaint;

   u. inherently evil practice, to pay taxpayers' money to private corporations for many reasons set forth in the complaint;

   v. direct (implied right of) action under U.S. Constitution and state constitutions if there is no federal or state statute permitting this lawsuit;

   w. to the extent state governments and their agencies have no right to enact special tax legislation or rules prohibiting a specific company from coming into the area to do business, the state governments and their agencies have no right to enact special tax legislation or rules giving a specific company tax benefits, exemptions and privileges not available to all others similarly situated;

   x. since it is illegal to penalize a specific for-profit corporation by requiring it to, say, a tax rate of twice as much as all other corporations are required to pay, it is illegal to reward or benefit a specific for-profit corporation by giving it a lower tax rate (or exempting it wholly from a tax) required to be paid by all other corporations;

   y. payment of taxpayer funds to private corporations is an unlawful taking and confiscation of money and property from taxpayers for the benefit of the favored private corporations;

   z. ultra vires acts by the ECD's and other government agencies, and by the favored corporations; the state and local governments have no power under law to tax people including private corporations and turn over some or all of these tax revenues to private for-profit corporations;

   aa. unlawful waste of taxpayer money because the need of state and local government to perform its governmental services is not served by handing over taxpyayers' money to private corporations;

   bb. violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Art. IV, Section 2, and 14th Amendment, Section 1; and violation of similar provisions in the State Constitutions, e.g., New York Constitution, Art. I, Section 1, stating in part: "No member of this state shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers....";

   cc. If a state or local government or government agency should not be the owner of businesses, then it should not finance what it cannot own; and if the government or government agency does have the power under law to own businesses, it should own them and sell them when desiring to cease ownership, rather than to finance a private corporation's ownership of the business;

   dd. violation of the state and local constitutional, statutory and rule provisions requiring bidding for government contracts, which provisions are intended to ensure that state and local governments and their agencies make their purchases without corruption and at the lowest prices; for example, N.Y. Constitutional provision Art. VIII, Section 1, which provides in part:

   No county, city, town, village or school district shall give or loan any money or property to or in aid of any individual, or private corporation or association, or private undertaking, or become directly or indirectly the owner of stock in, or bonds of, any private corporation or association; nor shall any county, city, town, village or school district give or loan its credit to or in aid of any individual, or public or private corporation or association, or private undertaking, * * * .

   ee. The interests obtained by the state, city, county or other governmental subdivision or agency, when financing the private corporation, falls within the state and local constitutional, statutory and rule provisions referred to in the preceding sub-paragraph, including N.Y. Constitutional Art. VIII, Section 1;

   ff. undermines and forces radical change of the political, economic and social stability of the United States (through the financing of globalization) without any opportunity for review and approval by the voters or their elected representatives;

   gg. the financing practices of which plaintiff complains are used primarily to finance the retail superstore chains and manufacturers from which they buy, which companies are in continual violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, and destroying their small and independent business competitors in the process;

   If you have any other legal theories you believe might be appropriate for use in the complaint, please let me know right away, carlpers@ix.netcom.com, telephone number 212-307-4444 and fax number 212-307-0247.

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   Supreme Court [dissenting] discussion and survey of federal and state laws requiring competitive bidding

   Another legal theory set forth above is that the contracts by ECD's financing superstores and paying for job acquisition and retention violate the state laws requiring competitive bidding. Justice Scalia, in a dissenting opinion, provides us with a substantial 50-state survey of the laws requiring competitive bidding, and also discusses how federal law requires the same.

   The ECD's run afoul of the competitive bidding requirement because they do not offer to purchase jobs (or job retention) from all employers, or responsible employers, but only offer the taxpayer's money to a single corporation. The occasionable competition by a town with one or more other towns for the same set of jobs is not a competitive bidding requirement involving a minimum of three sellers or a public request for bid.

   In Board of County Commissioners, Wabaunsee County, Kansas v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 690-700, 116 S. Ct. 2361, 135 L. Ed. 2d 843, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 2462, **9-19 (1996), dissenting Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) provided a lengthy discussion and survey of federal and state laws requiring competitive bidding, as follows:

   II.

   The Court's decision to enter this field cannot be justified by the consideration (if it were ever a justification) that the democratic institutions of government have not been paying adequate attention to the problems it presents. The American people have evidently decided that political influence in government contracting, like many other things that are entirely constitutional, is not entirely desirable, and so they have set about passing laws to prohibit it in some but not all instances. As a consequence, government contracting is subject to the most extraordinary number of laws and regulations at the federal, state, and local levels.

   The United States Code contains a categorical statutory prohibition on political contributions by those negotiating for or performing contracts with the Federal Government, 2 U.S.C. Section 441c, competitive bidding requirements for contracts with executive agencies, 41 U.S.C. Sections 252-253, public corruption and bribery statutes, e. g., 18 U.S.C. Section 201, and countless other statutory requirements that restrict Government officials' discretion in awarding contracts. "There are already over four thousand individual statutory provisions that affect the [Defense Department's] procurement process." Pyatt, Procurement Competition at Work: The Navy's Experience, 6 Yale J. Reg. 319, 319-320 (1989). Federal regulations are even more widespread. As one handbook in the area has explained, "their procedural and substantive requirements dictate, to an oftentimes astonishing specificity, how the entire contracting process will be conducted." ABA General Practice Section, Federal Procurement Regulations: Policy, Practice and Procedures 1 (1987). That is why it is no surprise in this area to find a 253-page book just setting forth "fundamentals," E. Massengale, Fundamentals of Federal Contract Law (1991), or a mere "deskbook" that runs 436 pages, ABA Section of Public Contract Law, Government Contract Law: The Deskbook for Procurement Professionals (1995). Such "summaries" are indispensable when, for example, the regulations that constitute the "Federal Acquisition Regulations System" total some 5,037 pages of fine print. See Title 48 CFR (1995).

   Similar systems of detailed statutes and regulations exist throughout the States. In addition to the various statutes criminalizing bribes to government officials and other forms of public corruption, all 50 States have enacted legislation imposing competitive bidding requirements on various types of contracts with the government. n1 Government contracting is such a standard area for state regulation that a model procurement code has been developed, which is set forth in a 265-page book complete with proposed statutes, regulations, and explanations. See ABA Section of Urban, State and Local Government Law, Model Procurement Code for State and Local Governments (1981). As of 1989, 15 States had enacted legislation based on the model code. See ABA Section of Urban, State and Local Government Law, Annotations to the Model Procurement Code vii-viii (2d ed. 1992) (and statutes cited).

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   n1 See, e. g., Ala. Code Section 11-43C-70 (1989); id., Section 24-1-83 (1992); id., Section 41-16-20 (Supp. 1995); Alaska Stat. Ann. Section 36.30.100 (1992); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 41-2533 (1992); Ark. Code Ann. Sections 14-47-120, 14-47-138, 14-48-117, 14-48-129 (1987); Cal. Pub. Cont. Code Ann. Sections 10302, 10309, 10373, 10501, 10507.7, 20723, 20736, 20751, 20803, 20921, 21501, 21631 (West 1985 and Supp. 1996); Cal. Pub. Util. Code Ann. Section 131285 (West 1991); Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. Section 674 (West Supp. 1996); Colo. Rev. Stat. Section 24-103-202 (Supp. 1995); Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 4a-57 (Supp. 1996); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 9, Section 671 (1989); id., Tit. 29, Section 6903(a) (1991); Fla. Stat. Section 190.033 (Supp. 1996); id., Section 287.057 (1991 and Supp. 1996); Ga. Code Ann. Section 2-10-10 (1990); id., Sections 32-10-7, 32-10-68 (1991 and Supp. 1995); Haw. Rev. Stat. Section 103D-302 (Supp. 1995); Idaho Code Section 33-1510 (1995); id., Section 43-2508 (Supp. 1995); id., Section 50-1710 (1994); id., Section 67-5711C (1995); id., Section 67-5718 (1995, and 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 198); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 50, § 20/20 (1993); id., ch. 65, Section 5/8-10-3 (1993); id., ch. 70, Sections 205/25, 225/25, 265/25, 280/1-24, 280/2-24, 290/26, 310/5-24, 320/1-25, 320/2-25, 325/1-24, 325/2-24, 325/3-24, 325/5-24, 325/6-24, 325/7-24, 325/8-24, 340/25, 2305/11, 2405/11, 2805/14, 2905/5-4 (1993 and Supp. 1996); Ind. Code Sections 2-6-1.5-2, 10-7-2-28, 4-13.6-5-2, 8-16-3.5-5.5 (Supp. 1995); Iowa Code Section 18.6 (1995); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 49-417(a) (Supp. 1990); id., Sections 75-3739 to 75-3741 (1989 and Supp. 1990, and 1996 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 201); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 162.070 (Baldwin 1990); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 39:1594 (West 1989); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 5, Sections 1743, 1743-A (1989); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 25, Section 3(l) (Supp. 1995, and 1996 Md. Laws, ch. 66); id., Art. 25A, Section 5(F) (Supp. 1995); Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. Sections 3-103(g)(3), 8-1005(c) (Supp. 1995); Mass. Gen. Laws Sections 149-44A to 149-44M (1989 and Supp. 1996); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. Section 247.661c (West Supp. 1996); Minn. Stat. Section 16B.07 (1988 and Supp. 1996); Miss. Code Ann. Section 27-35-101 (1995); id., Sections 31-7-13, 37-151-17 (Supp. 1995); Mo. Rev. Stat. Sections 34.040.1, 34.042.1, 68.055.1 (Supp. 1996); Mont. Code Ann. Sections 7-3-1323, 7-5-2301, 7-5-2302, 7-5-4302, 7-14-2404 (1995); Neb. Rev. Stat. Sections 81-885.55, 84-1603 (1994); Nev. Rev. Stat. Section 332.065 (1984); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 28:8 (1988); id., Section 186-C:22(VI) (Supp. 1995); id., Section 228:4 (1993); N. J. Stat. Ann. Section 28:1-7 (West 1981); N. M. Stat. Ann. Section 13-1-102 (1992); N. Y. Alt. County Govt. Law Section 401 (McKinney 1993); N. Y. Gen. Mun. Law Section 103 (McKinney 1986 and Supp. 1996); N. C. Gen. Stat. Section 133-10.1 (1995); id., Section 143-49 (1993); N. D. Cent. Code Section 54-44.4-05 (Supp. 1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Sections 307.90, 511.12 (1994); id., Section 3381.11 (1995); Okla. Stat., Tit. 11, Section 24-114 (1994); id., Tit. 52, Section 318 (1991); id., Tit. 61, Section 101 (1989); Ore. Rev. Stat. Section 279.015 (1991); 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. Section 23308.1 (Supp. 1996); R. I. Gen. Laws Section 45-55-5 (Supp 1995); S. C. Code Ann. Section 11-35-1520 (Supp. 1995); S. D. Codified Laws Sections 5-18-2, 5-18-3 (1994); id., § 5-18-9 (Supp. 1996); id., Sections 9-42-5, 11-7-44 (1995); id., Section 13-49-16, 42-7A-5 (1991); Tenn. Code Ann. Sections 12-3-202, 12-3-203, 12-3-1007 (1992 and Supp. 1995); Tex. Educ. Code Ann. Section 51.907 (1987); Tex. Loc. Govt. Code Ann. Sections 252.021, 262.023, 262.027, 271.027, 375.221 (1988 and Supp. 1996); Utah Code Ann. Section 17A-2-1195 (1991); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 29, Section 152(12) (1986); Va. Code Ann. Sections 11-41, 11-41.1 (1993); Wash. Rev. Code Sections 28A.160.140, 36.32.250 (Supp. 1996); W. Va. Code Sections 4-7-7, 5-6-7 (1994); Wis. Stat. Section 30.32 (1989 and Supp. 1995); id., Section 60.47 (1988 and Supp. 1995); Wyo. Stat. Section 35-2-429 (1994).

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   By 1992, more than 25 local jurisdictions had also adopted legislation based on the Model Procurement Code, see id., at ix, and thousands of other counties and municipalities have over time devised their own measures. New York City, for example, which "each year . . . enter[s] into approximately 40,000 contracts worth almost $ 6.5 billion," has regulated the public contracting process by a myriad of codes and regulations that seek to assure "scrupulous neutrality in choosing contractors and [consequently impose] multiple layers of investigation and accountability." Anechiarico & Jacobs, Purging Corruption from Public Contracting: The 'Solutions' Are Now Part of the Problem, 40 N.Y.L.S.L. Rev. 143, 143-144 (1995) (hereinafter Anechiarico & Jacobs).

   These examples of federal, state, and local statutes, codes, ordinances, and regulations could be multiplied to fill many volumes. They are the way in which government contracts have been regulated, and the way in which public policy problems that arise in the area have been addressed, since the founding of the Republic. See, e. g., Federal Procurement Regulations: Policy, Practice and Procedures, at 11-196 (describing the history of federal government procurement regulation). But these laws and regulations have brought to the field a degree of discrimination, discernment, and predictability that cannot be achieved by the blunt instrument of a constitutional prohibition.

   Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations would not contain the 5,000+ pages it does if it did not make fine distinctions, permitting certain actions in some government acquisition areas and prohibiting them in others. Similarly, many of the competitive bidding statutes that I have cited contain exceptions for, or are simply written not to include, contracts under a particular dollar amount, n2 or those covering certain subject matters, n3 or those that are time sensitive. n4 A political unit's decision not to enact contracting regulations, or to suspend the regulations in certain circumstances, amounts to a decision to permit some degree of political favoritism. As I shall discuss shortly, O'Hare's and Umbehr's First Amendment permits no such selectivity -- or at least none that can be known before litigation is over.

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   n2 See, e. g., 41 U.S.C. Sections 252a(b), 403(11) (certain federal contracting laws rendered inapplicable "to a contract or subcontract that is not greater than" $ 100,000); Cal. Pub. Cont. Code Ann. Section 10507.7 (West Supp. 1996) (lowest-responsible-bidder requirement for certain goods and materials only applicable to "contracts involving an [annual] expenditure of more than fifty thousand dollars"); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 50, Section 20/20 (1993) (lowest-responsible-bidder requirement for certain construction contracts not applicable to contracts for more than $ 5,000); N. Y. Gen. Mun. Law Section 103.1 (McKinney Supp. 1996) (not covering public-work contracts for $ 20,000 or less or purchase contracts for $ 10,000 or less); S. D. Codified Laws Section 5-18-3 (Supp. 1996) (requiring competitive bidding process for certain public-improvement contracts "involving the expenditure of twenty-five thousand dollars or more"); Tex. Loc. Govt. Code Ann. Section 262.023(a) (Supp. 1996) (applying only to "a contract that will require an expenditure exceeding $ 15,000").

   n3 See, e. g., Idaho Code § 33-1510 (1995); N. J. Stat. Ann. Section 28:1-7 (1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Section 511.12 (Supp. 1995); Okla. Stat., Tit. 52, Section 318 (1991); Utah Code Ann. Section 17A-2-1195 (1991).

   n4 See, e. g., Del. Code Ann., Tit. 29, Section 6903(a)(2) (1991); Fla. Stat. Section 287.057(3)(a) (Supp. 1996); Minn. Stat. Section 16B.08(6) (1988); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 228:4(I)(e) (1993); Tenn. Code Ann. Sections 12-3-202(3), 12-3-206 (1992).

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   III

   If inattention by the democratic organs of government is not a plausible reason for the Court's entry into the field, then what is? I believe the Court accepts (any sane person must accept) the premise that it is utterly impossible to erect, and enforce through litigation, a system in which no citizen is intentionally disadvantaged by the government because of his political beliefs. I say the Court accepts that, because the O'Hare opinion, in a rare brush with the real world, points out that "O'Hare was not part of a constituency that must take its chance of being favored or ignored in the larger political process -- for example, by residing or doing business in a region the government rewards or spurns in the construction of public works." Post, at 720-721. Of course. Government favors those who agree with its political views, and disfavors those who disagree, every day -- in where it builds its public works, in the kinds of taxes it imposes and collects, in its regulatory prescriptions, in the design of its grant and benefit programs -- in a million ways, including the letting of contracts for government business. What good reason has the Court given for separating out this last way, and declaring it to be (as all the others for some reason are not) an "abridgment of the freedom of speech"? As I have explained, I would separate the permissible from the impermissible on the basis of our Nation's traditions, which is what I believe sound constitutional adjudication requires. In Elrod and Branti, the Court rejected this criterion -- but if what it said did not make good constitutional law, at least it made some sense: the loss of one's job is a powerful price to pay for one's politics. But the Court then found itself on the fabled slippery slope that Justice Holmes's aphorism about history and logic warned about: one logical proposition detached from history leads to another, until the Court produces a result that bears no resemblance to the America that we know. The next step was Rutan, which extended the prohibition of political motivation from firing to hiring. The third step is today's Umbehr, which extends it to the termination of a government contract. And the fourth step (as I shall discuss anon) is today's O'Hare, which extends it to the refusal to enter into contractual relationships.

   If it is to be possible to dig in our cleats at some point on this slope -- before we end up holding that the First Amendment requires the city of Chicago to have as few potholes in Republican wards (if any) as in Democratic ones -- would not the most defensible point of termination for this indefensible exercise be public employment? A public employee is always an individual, and a public employee below the highest political level (which is exempt from Elrod) is virtually always an individual who is not rich; the termination or denial of a public job is the termination or denial of a livelihood. A public contractor, on the other hand, is usually a corporation; and the contract it loses is rarely its entire business, or even an indispensable part of its entire business. As Judge Posner put it:

   "Although some business firms sell just to government, most government contractors also have private customers. If the contractor does not get the particular government contract on which he bids, because he is on the outs with the incumbent and the state does not have laws requiring the award of the contract to the low bidder (or the laws are not enforced), it is not the end of the world for him; there are other government entities to bid to, and private ones as well. It is not like losing your job." LaFalce v. Houston, 712 F.2d 292, 294 (CA7 1983).

   Another factor that suggests we should stop this new enterprise at government employment is the much greater volume of litigation that its extension to the field of contracting entails. The government contracting decisions worth litigating about are much more numerous than the number of personnel hirings and firings in that category; and the litigation resources of contractors are infinitely more substantial than those of fired employees or rejected applicants. Anyone who has had even brief exposure to the intricacies of federal contracting law knows that a lawsuit is often used as a device to stay or frustrate the award of a contract to a competitor. See, e.g., Delta Data Systems Corp. v. Webster, 240 U.S. App. D.C. 182, 744 F.2d 197 (CADC 1984); Delta Data Systems Corp. v. Webster, 244 U.s. App. D.C. 39, 755 F.2d 938 (CADC 1985). What the Court's decisions today mean is that all government entities, no matter how small, are at risk of Section 1983 lawsuits for violation of constitutional rights, unless they adopt (at great cost in money and efficiency) the detailed and cumbersome procedures that make a claim of political favoritism (and a Section 1983 lawsuit) easily defended against. [Emphasis added.]

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   Remedies Sought in the Job-Theft Lawsuit

   The following remedies were requested in the lawsuit:

   1. Class action in which the defendants named are alleged to be members of a class of all economic development agencies, industrial development agencies, and other state agencies, and states in the United States [to be able to bind all agencies employing the job-theft practice at the same time, in the same lawsuit]
   2. Injunction prohibiting any further job-theft activities;
   3. Declaratory judgment to the effect that job-theft activities as described are illegal for a variety of reasons), under 28 U.S.C. Sections 2201, 2202;
   4. Declaratory judgment and injunction prohibiting any further transfers of benefits under any outstanding job-theft agreements;
   5. Declaratory judgment declaring all job-theft agreements illegal and void or voidable;
   6. Requirement that each member of the class give notice to various types of persons (including legislators, official publications, local press, government agencies, government officials, corporations in contract with an agency, and others) as to the judgment of the court;
   7. Requirement that each agency sue the corporations receiving benefits for recovery of the benefits if the corporation in any respect is in breach of contract;
   8. Order permitting any taxpayer in a state to bring suit on behalf of the state, city, town or agency against a corporation receiving benefits but in breach of its contract, if no action has been commenced by the state, city, town or agency within 6 months from the date of the judgment (or 6 months from the date of the most recent breach of contract);
   9. Order setting up trustee to receive periodic reports from each of the defendants as to compliance with the court's judgment, to be paid for by the defendants; and for the trustee to submit periodic compliance reports to the parties and the Court;

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   !! NEW !! - Chronology of Major Events in the Job-Theft Lawsuit Filed 8/27/01

   The following is a list of the major events in the job-theft lawsuit, starting with the filing of the complaint:

   1. 8/27/01 - Filing of Complaint
   2. 8/31/01 - Service of Summons and Complaint on the 4 defendants (date is approximate)
   3. 9/20/01 - Letter by attorney for NYS defendants to the Court requesting permission to make motion to dismiss complaint as to the two NYS defendants claiming lack of jurisdiction and lack of plaintiff's standing to commence suit as to the 2 NYS defendants; letter claims that the Yankee/Mets stadium financing plans are on the "back burner" and do not require this lawsuit to oppose
   4. 9/20/01 - Defendants' time to answer or move against complaint extended by consent of plaintiff to 11/15/01
   5. 10/8/01 - Plaintiff voluntarily dismisses complaint against the 2 NYS defendants

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   What the Press Says about the Competition between Cities/Counties for Jobs

   Here is what the press is saying about state and local governments and governmental agencies paying to obtain or retain jobs for their communities:

   1. Newsday, 8/21/01, Viewpoints, "Cities Whiff When Paying for Ballparks with Tax $$", saying in part:

      With all this talk about subsidies, one might get the impression that building ballparks is a smart thing for government to do. It's not.

      The economics are simply dismal. According to the independent studies that examine what actually has occurred in various venues - as opposed to the promotional reports produced by the teams and pro-subsidy politicians - taxpayer handouts for stadiums offer no net benefits in terms of economic expansion, income growth or job creation. In the end, subsidized stadiums and arenas amount to nothing more than unsavory corporate welfare.

      Subsidizing multimillionaire team owners and players is just another case of an elite, politically connected special interest benefiting at the cost of the taxpayers.

      It's bad economics, stupid politics, not to mention morally wrong. Let the Mets, Yanks and BoSox build their own ballparks, just as other businesses build their own facilities.

   2. Time magazine, 11/9/98, Special Report, "Corporate Welfare", stated in part:

      [T]heir deals are usually trumpeted as "economic development" or "public-private partnerships." But a better name is corporate welfare. It's a game in which governments large and small subsidize corporations large and small, usually at the expense of another state or town and almost always at the expense of individual and other corporate taxpayers.

      ... It has turned politicians into bribery specialists, and smart business people into con artists. And most surprising of all, it has rarely created any new jobs. ...

      ... An 18-month TIME investigation has found that the same indictment [as applicable to traditional welfare programs], almost to the word, applies to corporate welfare. In some ways, it represents pork-barrel legislation of the worst order. The difference, of course, is that instead of rewarding the poor, it rewards the powerful.

      Over the past six years, Congress appropriated $ 5 billion to run the Export-Import Bank of the United States, which subsidizes companies that sell goods abroad. ... At these companies, which have accounted for about 40% of all loans, grants and long-term guarantees in this decade, overall employment has fallen 38%, as more than a third of a million jobs have disappeared.

      ... Politicians stumble over one another in the rush to arrange special deals for select corporations, fueling a growing economic war among the states. The result is that states keep throwing money at companies that in many cases are not serious about moving anyway. ...

      ...

      All this is in service of a system that may produce jobs in one city or state, thus fostering the illusion of an uptick in employment. But it does not create more jobs in the nation as a whole. ...

      Whatever the name, the result is the same. Some companies receive public services at reduced rates, while all others pay the full cost. Some companies are excused from paying all or a portion of their taxes due, while all others must pay the full amount imposed by law. Some companies receive grants, low-interest loans and other subsidies, while all others must fend for themselves.

      In the end, that's corporate welfare's greatest flaw. It's unfair. One role of government is to help ensure a level playing field for people and businesses. Corporate welfare does just the opposite. It tilts the playing field in favor of the largest or the most politically influential or most aggressive businesses. ...

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   What the Job-Theft Lawsuit Is Expected to Accomplish

   The lawsuit, if successful, is expected to end the competition among states, cities and towns to steal jobs from each other through payment of taxpayers' moneys to private corporations.

   The corporations now obtaining these public funds have to set up somewhere, and if every state, city, town and public agency in the United States is prohibited from paying for jobs, there will be a level playing field, permitting competition for jobs on a legitimate basis, such as the quality of the schools, the safety of the town, the quality of the roads, the educational level of the residents, and so on -- factors which benefit the community as a whole.

   Unless all competitors can be enjoined in a single suit (or stopped by a single federal statute), the unlawful competition for jobs (i.e., the job theft) will continue, to the continuing advantage of the corporations extracting the massive payments from the state and local governments, and to the detriment of competitors, taxpayers and the governments involved.

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   Persons and Organizations Who Will Benefit from the Job-Theft Lawsuit

   Assuming the lawsuit is successful, the winners will be:

   1. Competitors who no longer will have to compete against companies financed with tax dollars;
   2. Owners of small and independent businesses which will no longer be thrown out of business by superstores financed with taxpayers' money;
   3. Employees of small and independent businesses who do not lose their jobs;
   4. States, cities and towns which no longer hand over millions, tens of millions and even hundreds of millions of dollars to a for-profit superstore chain or multi-national corporation to induce them to stay, or to transfer their location and jobs to the state, city or town
   5. Taxpayers who no longer pay high taxes to cover the payments made to the superstores and other multi-national corporations to have them stay or transfer their location and employees to such state, city or town
   6. Opponents of globalization;
   7. Proponents of small business;
   8. Proponents of social welfare programs for older and needy persons (which programs are being scrapped gradually through globalization);
   9. Persons trying to get elected to an office who are unable to use taxpayer money, for payment to already-wealthy corporations, to encourage campaign contributions for the reelection process;
   10. The political process, by eliminating a system which probably is rife with corruption (kickbacks, payments and sweetheart deals to encourage local officials to enter into multi-million dollar deals with the major corporations);
   11. Others mentioned throughout this website.

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   Some Relevant Decisions - UNDER CONTINUOUS CONSTRUCTION

   Various issues are apt to arise in this lawsuit, and I want to start collecting some relevant decisions under this heading for possible future use:

   1. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947 1942, 20 L.Ed. 947, 1968 U.S. LEXIS 1348 (1968) held that taxpayers had standing to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction when attacking a federal education statute alleging that it violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the 1st Amendment
   2. United States v. New York, 972 F.2d 464, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18654, 22 E.L.R. 21506 (1992) held that a taxpayer had standing to challenge a municipal contract
   3. Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 118 S. Ct. 766, 139 L. Ed. 2d 717 (1998) held that a New York State income-tax statutory provisions denying an alimony deduction only to non-residents violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Art. IV, Cl. 2, of the United States Constitution and therefore was unconstitutional

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   Evidence, Witnesses and Interested Persons Wanted

   This lawsuit involves billions of dollars of transfers of taxpayers' money to private superstore chains and multi-national corporations.

   Witnesses are needed to help prove the allegations. For example, I'm looking for witnesses who have negotiated job-theft deals for either side, to be able to get a better understanding of the forces at work. Also, I would like witnesses who know and can testify that the favored corporation would have remained in the same location even if no subsidy was granted. Also, I need witnesses who know and can testify that the favored corporation never intended to honor all or some of its contractual obligations.

   In addition, I would like persons to contact me who may be interested in getting involved in the lawsuit. There are many things which need to be done, from publicity, to factual research, to interviewing witnesses, doing legal research, and various other things that make up a lawsuit.

   To contact me, Carl E. Person, you can use any of these communications means: carlpers@ix.netcom.com, telephone number 212-307-4444 and fax number 212-307-0247.

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   Financial and Other Contributions Sought for the Fight

   When suing in an action such as this, involving billions of dollars in prospective losses to superstore chains and other multi-national corporations, you can expect to have substantial expenses, legal and disbursements. I have the legal expenses covered already, but the out-of-pocket expenses can amount to a substantial amount of money, and I would like some help with these expenses.

   Any contributions could probably be justified as a business expense on the contributor's part, and will be used as a litigation expense from my standpoint. The contribution would not qualify as a charitable contribution.

   Some of the persons who might be interested in making a contribution to this lawsuit are: unions, taxpayer organizations, trade associations for small businesses, groups trying to prevent superstores from coming into their community, persons and organizations trying to combat the evils of globalizations -- just to name a few.

   To arrange for or discuss the making of a contribution, you can communicate with me (attorney Carl E. Person) using any of the following communications means: carlpers@ix.netcom.com, telephone number 212-307-4444 and fax number 212-307-0247.

   I might add, that I'm not waiting for contributions before commencing this lawsuit.

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   Add Your Name to List for E-Mail Updates

   If you would be interested in receiving periodic updates on the status of the lawsuit or other information about job-theft practices in the United States, please add your name to the mailing list.

   [OCS please add the appropriate language]

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   Related Websites and Other Resources Concerning Job Theft

   The following are important resources on the job-theft problem:

   1. Website on How to Prevent Wal-Mart and Other Superstores from Opening Up a Superstore in a Community; and How to Stop Globalization
   2. Website on the Robinson-Patman Act Which Prohibits Price Discrimination and How to Recover Damages Caused by Unlawful Price Discrimination

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   Books Relating to Job Theft

   The following books will be useful to anyone exploring the problem of job theft:

   Recommended Books on How to Stop Wal-Mart and Other Superstores from Coming Into Your Community

   1. SLAM-DUNKING WAL-MART! - How You Can Stop Superstore Sprawl in Your Hometown, by Al Norman, hardcover, Raphel Marketing (Atlantic City, NJ), 1999, $29.95
   2. IN SAM WE TRUST - THE UNTOLD STORY OF SAM WALTON AND WAL-MART, THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL RETAILER, by Bob Ortega, paperback, Times Business/Random House, NY NY, 2000, US$16.00
   3. HOW WAL-MART IS DESTROYING AMERICA (and the World) - And What You Can Do About It, by Bill Quinn, paperback, Ten Speed Press (Berkeley, CA), 2000, $US$10.95
   4. NICKEL AND DIMED - ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA, by Barbara Ehrenreich, hardcover, Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt, NY NY, 2001, US$23.00

   Recommended Books Exposing the Evils of Globalization

   1. THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (AND FOR A TURN TOWARD THE LOCAL), edited by Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith, published in paperback by Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, 1996, US$17.00
   2. WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD, by David C. Korten, paperback, Kumarian Press/Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1995, US$19.95
   3. THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE - GATT, NAFTA, AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE POWER, by Ralph Nader, William Greider, Dick Morris and others, published by Earth Island Press / North Atlantic Books, 1993
   4. CORPORATION NATION - HOW CORPORATIONS ARE TAKING OVER OUR LIVES AND WHAT AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT, by Charles Derber, with an introduction by Ralph Nader, published in paperback St. Martin's Griffin, New York, 1998 (and 2000), US$14.95 (with comments by Jonathan Kozol, Ralph Nader, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Noam Chomsky, Senator Paul Wellstone and David Korten
   5. ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT - THE MANIC LOGIC OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM, by William Greider, published by Simon & Schuster, 1997, US$27.50
   6. OPPOSING THE SYSTEM, by Charles A. Reich, hardcover, published by Crown, 1995, US$23.00
   7. AMERICA: WHO STOLE THE DREAM?, by Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, paperback, published by Andrews & McMeel, K.C., Mo., 1996, US$9.95
   8. WHO WILL TELL THE PEOPLE - THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, by William Greider, hardcover, Simon & Schuster, 1992, US$25.00

   Other books opposing the globalizing economy are listed in the above-listed books and at Other Books Opposing the Global Economy

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   Communicate with Website Author, Attorney Carl E. Person

   To contact me, Carl E. Person, use any of these communications means: carlpers@ix.netcom.com, telephone number 212-307-4444 and fax number 212-307-0247.

   I look forward to hearing from you.

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   List of State and Local Economic Development Agencies Which Are Named as Members of the Class of Defendants in the Job-Theft Lawsuit

   There are approximately 1,000 governmental economic development agencies in the United States, plus various private ones (generally run by utility companies). An important website lists the website addresses for all or substantially all economic development agencies which have a website. See Economic Development Directory Website. The availablity of a website for each listed agency makes the list useful as an immediate information tool.

   A list of a significant number of the existing economic development agencies can be created from this Economic Development Website, which lists all or most of the websites of economic development agencies throughout the world, including the United States.

   The U.S. agencies (both public and private) are listed by state, and by area within a state.

   Under the listing for the State of New York, there are approximately 90 public and private economic development agencies identified. See Economic Development Directory - New York List. New Jersey has approximately 90 identified agencies. See Economic Development Directory - New Jersey List.

   The Economic Development Administration of the United States Department of Commerce has also compiled and published (accurate as of 1/1/99) a directory of economic development agencies, in the United States. This list (by state and regions with each state) is available for downloading at Dept. of Commerce, Directory of Economic Development Agencies.

   The Department of Commerce directory was created by certain listed organizations, with assistance of the National Association of State Development Agencies as to State Government Offices.

   The lawsuit does not need to name each of the class members in its complaint. The complaint only needs to describe the proposed class, and state approximately how many members there are in such class. At this time I estimate that the number of members in the proposed class of defendants will be approximately 1,000. It is presumed that private corporations with economic development offices (such as regulated utilities) would not be using tax dollars as part of their economic package and for such reason would not be included within the definition for class membership.

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